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The Orange Revolution in November-December 2004 against falsifications
of the presidential election was a tremendous step forward in the
democratization of Ukraine. Since the election, however, democratically
elected President Viktor Yushchenko has faced impediments in
implementing his reform policies, supported by a majority of Ukrainians.
One of the main impediments arises from the compromise reached in the
Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada) on December 8, 2004 (between the
fraudulent second round and the run-off). The compromise made possible
the December run-off election which Yushchenko ultimately won,
although many analysts criticize some of its provisions, including
oversight powers granted to the Prosecutor General and the power
granted to the Rada to dismiss any minister by a simple majority. Most
notably, the constitutional reform (effective January 1, 2006) will reduce
the powers of the presidency and increase the role of prime minister and
the new parliament which will be elected in March 2006. As a result,
growing populism in Ukrainian politics on the eve of new parliamentary
elections led to a decline in economic performance and the split between
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Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in September 2005.
This split resulted in the formation of a new cabinet under Yuri
Yekhanurov, viewed as a more pragmatic politician than the populist
Tymoshenko.
After the Revolution: A Broad Coalition in Power
After its inauguration, the new leadership of Ukraine enjoyed a higher
level of public support than any Ukrainian government since 1991. Even
members of the former pro-Kuchma majority in the Rada (interested in
political survival) began to re-brand themselves as supporters of the
Orange Revolution. Under the same umbrella, many members of the
former nomenklatura were included in new power structures at regional
and local levels. Such attempts provoked protests from Yushchenko’s
supporters, and in two oblasts (Khmelnitskiy and Dnipropetrovsk),
popular opposition to appointments of new governors forced Yushchenko
to cancel his decisions. Some radical groups such as Pora (the student
organization that played an important role in the revolution) demanded
investigations of those responsible for election fraud and voter
intimidation. As a result, a group of former high-ranking officials and
tycoons fled the country, some of them to Russia. The former minister of
internal affairs and the former minister of transportation both committed
suicide.
The absence of effective opposition and high social expectations
created a window of opportunity for accelerating reforms. On the other
hand, these factors intensified internal disagreements within the broad
coalition in power. There were at least four different teams in the
coalition, which began to compete for influence.
The most powerful group, and the one closest to the president,
consisted of the deputies and businessmen who had supported
Yushchenko politically and financially since 2000-2002. A powerful
member of this group, Petro Poroshenko, had expected to be nominated as
prime minister, but the president decided at the last moment to appoint
Tymoshenko. Poroshenko was appointed secretary of the National
Security and Defense Council, with the power to advise the president on
nominations of high law enforcement officers and judges. Another
member of this team, Oleksander Tretyakov, secured the crucial position
of first aide to the president, in charge of his daily calendar. Mykola
Martynenko led the Our Ukraine faction, the largest one in the Rada. In
hopes of securing victory in the 2006 parliamentary election, the faction
transformed itself into a new composite party to build mass public
support. The new party, People’s Union “Our Ukraine,” was supported by
many Ukrainian businessmen, including not only those who supported
Yushchenko’s campaign, but also those who had recently decided to join
its ranks.
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The monopoly of this team’s influence over the president was
challenged by Prime Minister Tymoshenko. Her energy and image as
radical antagonist of Ukraine’s former president Leonid Kuchma helped
her to persuade the public that she would be the best choice for prime
minister. However, after several months in office, she began to act
contrary to presidential orders. Tymoshenko developed a reputation as a
cunning leader who would win by any means. Her faithful supporter
Oleksander Turchynov was appointed the head of the Security Service.
She claimed the right to lead the slate of the presidential bloc of parties
during the 2006 election campaign. To secure her position, Tymoshenko
formed a large parliamentary faction with two smaller associated groups,
totaling 60-65 MPs (one-sixth of the whole parliament). As in the case of
Our Ukraine, her faction included previous Kuchma supporters.
The Socialist Party (SPU) with its long-time leader Oleksander Moroz,
and the People’s Party led by Parliamentary Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn,
both approached Yushchenko at the close of presidential elections.
Although Moroz and Lytvyn have different backgrounds and had been
political enemies, they both became engineers of the constitutional reform
and did much to peacefully resolve the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko
agreed to appoint three Socialist ministers, including minister of internal
affairs. An SPU member was also selected to head the State Property
Fund, responsible for the privatization process. Contrary to expectations
that Socialists would clash quickly with the liberal presidential camp, it
was instead Tymoshenko who became their main rival. As lobbyists of
domestic producers, the Socialists objected to Tymoshenko’s open-door
trade policy, which reduced trade barriers and led to a rapid growth of
imports. They also feared that Tymoshenko’s social policies would be
attractive to traditional SPU voters.
Lytvyn’s People’s Party was formed by businessmen, bureaucrats, and
regional elites who found themselves between the new opposition and the
new party of power. The party pragmatically decided to support most of
the new president’s initiatives in exchange for security guarantees for
their businesses. Thus, Lytvyn secured a middle-of-the-road position. He
was warmly greeted in Moscow; in contrast, Russia’s attorney general
continued to charge Tymoshenko with bribery and she never visited
Moscow as prime minister.
Economic Reasons for the Yushchenko–Tymoshenko
Divorce
The most difficult task for Yushchenko was to harmonize into a unified
vision the competing variants of reforms represented in Ukraine’s
coalition leadership. The second task was to accomplish urgent reforms,
given the government’s limited resources and time.
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Although the Kuchma government benefited from 12 percent
economic growth in its last year, its populist measures of increasing
salaries and pensions created a deficit of 19 billion hryvnia ($3.7 billion)
for the 2005 budget. The Tymoshenko cabinet ordered a new draft of the
state budget. However, by increasing social payments itself, her cabinet
increased the deficit to 32 billion hryvnia ($6.3 billion). After nearly all
parliamentary factions approved it, Yushchenko agreed to sign, on the
grounds that the deficits were justified by the population’s low incomes.
At the same time, the president demanded that the cabinet find new ways
to ease the administrative and fiscal burden on businesses and to
stimulate the legitimate economy at the expense of Ukraine’s shadow
economy.
Instead, Tymoshenko implemented strong administrative remedies.
These brought stunning success in the beginning but almost complete
failure at the end of the day. One of the greatest successes was a program
to stop smuggling, which increased paid duties by 200 percent. The
government also succeeded in collecting more taxes from businesses,
while increasing the fiscal pressure on small and medium enterprises.
Businesses waited in vain for a promised economic amnesty to
entrepreneurs who had been forced to work in the shadow economy.
Government actions shocked a business community that had expected
more liberal treatment. They felt deceived and returned to old schemes of
avoiding taxation. Administrative pressures increased prices for meat and
sugar, while a massive flow of social spending accelerated the growth of
consumer prices. Tymoshenko tried to force oil companies to sell fuel at
fixed prices, but Russian giants (including Lukoil, TNK-BP, and Tatneft)
warned Yushchenko that such a policy could end in an energy crisis, and
the president canceled Tymoshenko’s decisions. Moreover, revaluation of
the national currency by 6 percent in April, aimed at cutting inflation, led
to a loss of about $1 billion for millions of citizens who had their savings
in U.S. dollars. In addition, with the revaluation exporters faced
disincentives to invest. All these missteps resulted in a slowing of
economic growth from 6 percent at the beginning of the year to minus 1.6
percent in August.
During the 2004 campaign, Yushchenko had promised to reconsider
the privatization deals done under dubious and sometimes illegal
conditions, especially that of the metallurgical giant Kryvorizhstal,
obtained at a very low price by Donetsk oligarch Rinat Akhmetov (who
supported Viktor Yanukovych, Kuchma’s candidate for presidency) and
Viktor Pinchuk, Kuchma’s son-in-law. After the election, Yushchenko
supported the idea of re-privatizing 20-30 enterprises of strategic
importance to the country. Tymoshenko, however, suggested the potential
re-privatization of 3,000 firms. She also canceled special economic zones
and declared a war on tax avoidance arrangements. As a result,
investment in Ukraine declined. Owners of large companies and banks
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began to look for foreign buyers, often in Russia, which played to the
Kremlin’s ambition to extend control over the Ukrainian economy. The
Kryvorizhstal re-privatization case was ultimately more or less
transparent, but this has been an exception rather than a common practice.
Tymoshenko’s Dismissal and the Formation of
Yekhanurov’s Government
The split between the liberal Yushchenko and the more populist and state-
oriented Tymoshenko was predicted by analysts from the very beginning.
In early September, the conflict within the leadership reached a climax
with the first high-profile resignation, that of presidential chief of staff
Oleksander Zinchenko, who claimed there was massive corruption in
Yushchenko’s entourage. Following this development, Yushchenko
attempted to resolve conflicts between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, but
their split proved insurmountable. In an effort to keep the government
from disintegrating entirely, Yushchenko made a difficult, brave, and
perhaps only possible decision: he dismissed the entire cabinet, accepted
Poroshenko’s resignation, and eliminated the position of the first aide to
the president.
Simultaneously, Yushchenko appointed his long-time associate Oleh
Rybachuk to be his new chief of staff (Rybachuk was vice prime minister
for European integration). He appointed his close associate Yuri
Yekhanurov as acting prime minister. Yekhanurov failed to gain sufficient
support on his first vote of confirmation, but he was confirmed by the
Rada on September 23 on a second vote.
Yekhanurov was first vice prime minister in the 1999-2001 cabinet
when Yushchenko was prime minister. He is considered to be a pragmatic
team player, and analysts believe that relations among the president, his
secretariat, and the new cabinet will function more effectively as a result
of the new appointments. Yekhanurov’s ethnic background is half-Buriat
and half-Ukrainian. In response to questions about his attitude towards
Russia, he noted that he had been born in Siberia and claimed this would
help him have friendly relations with Russia.
For many years, Yekhanurov was the official responsible for
privatization and development of small and medium businesses in
Ukraine. He promised to stop the re-privatization campaign (with the
exception of Kryvorizhstal and the Nikopol ferroalloy mill). Yekhanurov’s
confirmation as prime minister was supported even by Pinchuk’s political
group and by the Donetsk-based Party of Regions led by Yanukovych. It
is important to stress that Donetsk regional elites are not necessarily anti-
Yushchenko. They are not united, and one of the wealthiest industrial
groups, the Industrial Union of Donbas, supported Yushchenko even
before he was elected president.
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As a result of political compromises leading to Yekhanurov’s
confirmation, Tymoshenko supporters accused Yushchenko of reconciling
with former pro-Kuchma factions based on a declaration for stabilization
in Ukraine and a special memorandum with Yanukovych. As
Tymoshenko’s faction did not support Yekhanurov during the
confirmation, Yushchenko needed to secure support from other factions.
The new cabinet does not include the less savory members of the former
regime. Pro-European Borys Tarasyuk (Foreign Minister) and Anatoliy
Hrytsenko (Minister of Defense) retained their positions. The new
minister of justice is Serhiy Holovatyj, known for his opposition to
Kuchma. After his vote in favor of Yekhanurov, Holovatyj was removed
from Tymoshenko’s faction in the Rada.
Prospects
Barring surprises, on January 1, 2006, constitutional reform will be
implemented, and the cabinet will be answerable to the parliament. The
new parliamentary election system awards seats solely on the basis of
proportional representation (with a 3 percent threshold) that will likely
strengthen parties in Ukrainian politics. Both steps were demanded by the
anti-Kuchma opposition for many years.
It is likely that Tymoshenko’s anti-oligarchic and anti-corruption
rhetoric will result in increased electoral support for her party. The old
pro-Kuchma guard, primarily Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, might
benefit from a Yushchenko-Tymoshenko rivalry. However, Tymoshenko
may attract not only part of Yushchenko’s electorate in the west of the
country, but also part of Yanukovych’s electorate in the east. All major
players will try to improve relations with Russia, and Putin’s team might
benefit from it. The final electoral results will depend to a great extent on
the socioeconomic situation in the country.
Nevertheless, it is clear that no single political force will be able to
form a one-party cabinet. Despite the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko split, after
the election they may create a new coalition government (with the
possible participation of Lytvyn or the Socialists). After the failure of the
previous regime’s use of administrative resources and falsifications in the
2004 presidential campaign, it is also clear that the next election will
basically reflect the preferences of the Ukrainian electorate. The continued
support of international organizations for free and fair elections, the
building of civil society, and free mass media will further benefit
Ukrainian society.
No matter who wins the election, who forms the cabinet, and the exact
form of cohabitation between President Yushchenko and the new prime
minister, the Ukrainian political system will be less authoritarian, with
greater clarity on division of powers, and will thus move closer to
European standards.
